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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GROVER THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN E. HARRIS, Warden of the
Utah State Penitentiary,
Defendant.

Case No. 6655

CARL ROLLAND DEMMICK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN E. HARRIS, Warden of the
Utah State Penitentiary,
Defendant.

Case No. 6656

STATEMENT OF CASE

The Plaintiffs in each of these cases were convicted
in a court of general jurisdiction of felonies and the
punishment was enhanced in each case under the provisions of 103-1-18 R.S.U. 1933. Apparently their contention is that they are entitled to an immediate and unconditional discharge, and they apparently desire that
this Court treat these proceedings in habeas corpus as
an appeal
The statement of the case contained in the Plaintiffs' brief sets forth verbatim the informations, verdicts,
sentences and committments in the cases in which the
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. - 2.·

Plaintiffs were committed to the custody of the Defendant herein. In view of the opinion in Jensen vs. Sevy,
Utah, 134 P. 2d 1081, it is doubtful that these are properly before the Court at this time because the applications for the writ, wherein these matters are alleged,
had served their purpose when the writ was issued and
are now functus officio. We have no desire to raise any
procedural matters and will consider that all of these
things are properly before the Court. It is our position
that in these habeas corpus proceedings only Point 2
contained in Plaintiff's brief is here ,material, that is,
whether or not section 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933, has been
repealed.
It is also our position that the Plaintiffs cannot in
any event be discharged even though this Court should
hold the judgment void but they should be remanded
to the Defendant herein to be taken before the District
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, there to have imposed upon them
a sentence for the felonies of which they were convicted
without the enhancement of punishment provided . for
by said section 103-1-18. Ex parte Folck, Folckvs. yvatson, 102 Utah 470, 132 P. 2d. 1_30 (1942).
Or this Court under the authority of Mutart- -vs~
Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67, could hold the ·sentence
imposed to be one for the indeterminate term~ as provided by law for felonies or which Plaintiffs were properly
convicted.
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3
POINTS INVOLVED
Point 1. In these habeas corpus proceedings the
Court is limited to a determination of whether section
103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 has been repealed.

Point 2. Section 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933, has not been
repealed by implication or otherwise.
Point 3. In each case it appears from the information thet Plaintiffs herein had been each twice sentenced
and committed to prison for terms of not less than three
years previous to the crime charged therein.
Point 4. The verdicts in both cases here involved
were proper and legal.
Point 5. Under section 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933, it
was not necessary that Plaintiffs had been convicted
of three felonies before proceedings could be commenced
to determine whether they were habitual criminals.
Point 6.

The committment of Demmick was legal.
POINT 1

IN THESE HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT IS Lil\1ITED TO A DETERMINATION
OF WHETHER SECTION 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 HAS
BEEN REPEALED.
It is stated in 25 Am. Jur. 159, Habeas Corpus,
section 26, that:
''The primary and, ordinarily, the only ques-
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tion involved in habeas corpus proceedings is one
of jurisdiction-namely, whether the particular
order, judgment or process whose validity is attacked is one coming within the lawful authority
of the court or officer making or issuing it. As it
may otherwise be stated, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, the scope of inquiry, where restraint is had by virtue of legal
process, is ordinarily limited to the validity of
the process on its face and the jurisdiction of the
court by which it was issued. The writ does not
lie to correct errors and irregularities committed
in the exercise of jurisdiction; but cognizance is
taken only of such defects as render absolutely
void the proceedings under which the petitioner
is imprisoned. In short, the writ reaches jurisdictional error only; it cannot properly be used
to serve the mere purpose of an appeal or writ
of error."
Plain·~iffs

attack the proceedings under which they
were committed to prison on the following grounds,
(1) that the statute authorizing enhancement of sentence had been repealed, (2) the sentences and committments in the previous convictions relied upon were not
for not less than three years, (3) the verdicts were improper because of the defective information, ( 4) that the
court could not try Plaintiffs until there had been a conviction of three felonies and ( 5) in the case of Demmick,
that the committment could not issue without a hearing.
A punishment imposed pursuant to a statute that
had been repealed would concededly be an act in excess
of jurisdiction. But even if this is so we submit that
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5
Plaintiffs are not entitled to an unconditional discharge.
Under Point 2 herein we contend there has been no repeal
of 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933.

1Jnder the second ground of attack certainly the trial
court had the authority to construe the section 103-1-18
and to make a determination of whether the sentences
and committments alleged in the informations as previous offenses cmne within the meaning of said section.
Its determination might be error but that is not an act
in excess of its jurisdiction. This Court has held that
it was within the jurisdiction of a trial court to construe
and make application of statutes. Bleon vs. Emery, 60
Utah 582, 209 P. 627 (1922) wherein it was said:
"l\ioreover, counsel, in his petition for a rehearing, entirely ignores the fact that in view that
the decision is rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding this court was restricted to the question
of whether the statute is valid or invalid. It is
elementary that mere errors of construction or
judgment, whether committed by a court or by
some board or officer, cannot be reviewed in a
habeas corpus proceeding.'' 1 Bailey on Habeas
Corpus, 30; Bruce vs. East, Sheriff, 43 Utah, 327,
134 Pac. 1175, and cases there cited.
If the Plaintiffs here were dissatisfied with the
rulings made their remedy was to appeal.
Pb.intiffs seem to take the position that this Court
in these proceedings can make a determination of whether
the sentences and committments alleged in the informa-
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tions come within 103-1-18 on the theory that this Court
can now determine whether the informations stated
public offenses. Such cannot be done in habeas corpus.
Areson vs. Pincock 62 Utah 527, 220 P. 503 (1923); Bruce
vs. East 43 Utah 327, 134- P. 1175. In each of these cases
contention was made that the pleadings under which
punishment was imposed did not state public offenses
but it was held that the courts wherein they were filed
had jurisdiction to determine that matter and hence the
failure to state a public offense was not grounds for
discharge in habeas corpus.
This Court in Areson vs. Pincock, supra, in speaking of thP. sufficiency of a complaint stated:
''But the question is not one of jurisdiction,
and may not be inquired into in habeas corpus
proceedings. It cannot be denied that the court
had jurisdiction generally to try the issues and
make the order complained of. Habeas corpus
takes cognizance only of defects of a jurisdictional
character, which render the proceedings not merely voidable, but absolutely void. Bruce vs. East,
43 Utah, 327, 134 Pac. 1175. The rule is well
settled and is supported by many cases. See annotation to Ex parte Robinson, L. R. A. 1918B,
1148. The following excerpt from the annotation
above referred to indicates the extent to which
the rule is applied:
"It has been said that, if from the accusations the court can deduce that the prosecutor
intended to charge an act which is a crime, habeas
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corpus will not lie, however defectively the act
is described; also that if the indictn1ent or information purports or atte1npts to state an offense,
and the court has jurisdiction to pass upon the
sufficiency of those statements, the defendants
after conviction will not be released on habeas
corpus; and that, 'if a crin1inal charge is colorable', or "sufficient to set the judicial mind in
motion" or to call upon it to act, or makes some
approach towards charging a criminal offense, or
iutimates the facts necessary to constitute the offense and a purpose to declare thereon, or tends
to show a criminal offense, no matter how informal or defective, or has a legal tendency to
prove each requirement of the statute, it will
shield the proceedings from collateral attack. In
a word, no errors or irregularities not going to
the question of jurisdiction are reviewable on
habeas corpus.' The rule has been laid down in
several cases involving the sufficiency of complaints to charge misdemeanors, although probably the doctrine was not intended to be limited
to this class of cases, that after trial and conviction for an alleged misdemeanor a prisoner will
not be liberated on a writ of habeas corpus because of the insufficiency of the complaint, if, by
any possible construction of the language employed therein, an offense against the law is thereby even defectively stated.'
In re Gregory, 219 U. S. 210, 31 Sup. Ct. 143,
55 L Ed. 184, Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for
the court, in a case where colorable questions were
presented by the information and evidence, stated
the rule as follows :
'A habeas corpus proceeding cnnnot be made
to perform the function of a writ of error and
we are not concerned with the question whether
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the information was sufficient or whether the
acts set forth in the agreed statement constituted
a crime, that is to say, whether the court properly
applied the law, if it be found that the court had
jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the
judgment'.''
In the annotation found at 57 A.L.R. 85 on ''Habeas
corpus to test the sufficiency of indictment or information as regards the offense sought to be charged,'' it
is said:

"* * * it has been held that where a criminal
proceeding is pending in a court of general jurisdiction, the indictment or information purporting
or attempting to state an offense of which the
court has jurisdiction, the question whether the
facts charged are sufficient to constitute an offense of that kind will not be examined into on a
ccllateral attack. In other words, if it can be deduced from the accusation that the prosecutor
intended to charge an act or an omission which
amounted to a crime known to the law, the court
has jurisdiction and habeas corpus will not lie,
however, defectively, the act or omission be
described. But if the act or omission charged or
attempted to be charged as an offense, is not a
crime known to the law, then the court is without
jurisdiction, and its judgment is a nullity."
In Convey vs. Haynes, 230 Iowa 485, 298 N.W. 647
(1941) it was held that a petitioner in habeas corpus
cannot question the sufficiency of -the indictment or information under which he was imprisoned unless the act
charged does not constitute an offense because the stat.
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ute is unconstitutional or where there is a total failure
to allege any offense kno,vn to the law.
Certainly in the case at bar there is known to the
law the offenses of burglary, grand larceny, and robbery
and it is known to the law that punishn1ents thereof are
enlu:nced by the perpetrator thereof being an habitual
criminal. This is what was attempted, at least, to be
alleged in the informations involved. The courts in those
proceedings had jurisdiction to determine whether the
allegations were sufficient.
Ex parte Bailey, 60 Old. Cr. 278, 64 P. 2d 278 (1936)
cited by Plaintiffs does not aid them in this regard.
There is no statute in Oklahoma using the words habitual
criminal. The Penal Code there refers only to ''Second
Offenses." The judgment was for being an habitual
crimi:na.l and the court stated it should have been for the
offense of petit larceny, second and subsequent offense.
In Utah our statute does refer to being an habitual
criminal.
In the Thompson case, for instance, the information,
the verdict, and the sentence were for robbery and being
an habitual criminal. This could only mean under our
statutes that he had committed robbery and had been
twice proviously convicted of felonies.
The verdicts in these cases follow the informations
and the court certainly had jurisdiction to submit these

to the jury.
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Plaintiffs next contention is that there could be no
finding that they were habitual criminals nor could proceedings be had to determine that question until after
the third conviction. We submit that this is a mere matter of procedure and cannot be inquired into in habeas
corpus. Ex parte Hayes 15 Utah 77, 47 P. 612 (1897);
Convey vs. Haynes, supra; in re Stone, 295 J\iich. 207,
294 N.W. 156 (1940); In re Bates, Idaho, 125 P. (2)
1017 (1942).
In Ex parte Hayes, supra, the petitioner in habeas
corpus contended that the sentence or judgment by virtue of which he was in confinement was void for the
reason his trial was not conducted in pursuance of law
in that the jury was not chosen pursuant to a valid law.
The petition was of course denied, this being merely a
matter of procedure. The court stated:
''The important and decisive question, which
confronts us at the outset, is, can this court, in a
collateral proceeding by habeas corpus, look beyond the judgment, and determine questions
which arose during the trial of the case, and
which, if they had been presented in the record
on appeal, might have resulted in a reversal of
the judgment~ We think not. The warrant appears fair and regular on its face, and that the
district court in which the case was tried had
jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter is
not, and cannot be successfully, questioned. This
being so, and that court being a court of record,
its judgment is binding upon all the world until
reversed in a regular way by appeal. A fortiori
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is this so after the judgtnent has been affirmed
by this court. Such a judgn1ent is final, and pronounces the law of the case. With what propriety,
then, can this court, by Ineans of habeas corpus,
substantially reverse a judgment which the law
has placed beyond our control'? The prisoner's
detention under the judgn1ent, the commitment
being regular on its face, cannot be unlawful unless that judgment is absolutely null and void;
and it cannot be null and void, when the court
had general jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, even though it may have erred in its
proceedings during the trial. Irregularities and
mere errors in proceedings will not render a judgment an absolute nullity, although they may render it voidable, and when voidable only it is conclusively presumed to be valid until reversed, and
it cannot be reversed by habeas corpus, because
habeas corpus does not authorize the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction; and 'no inquiry,' says
Chancellor Kent, 'is to be made into the legality
of any process, judgment, or decree, * * * where
the party is detained under the final decree or
judgment of a competent court.' 2 Kent, Comm.
30. The district court being a court of general
jurisdiction, the offense charged against the prisoner was cognizable in that court, and it was
competent to inflict the punishment provided by
law for the offense of which the prisoner was
convicted; and its judgment, not being reversed,
has all the obligation which the judgment of any
tribunal can have.
''If the judgment be voidable only, and hence
obligatory, because not reversed, we cannot look
beyond it on habeas corpus. If it be absolutely
void, the officer who detains the prisoner and
obeys the judgment is guilty of false imprison-
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men f. Would counsel for the prisoner in this case
undertake to maintain the position that the officer
is guilty of false imprisonment~ Clearly, the detention is authorized by the judgment and warrant
and the irr..J]risonment is not illegal. 'The habeas
corpus is undoubtedly an immediate remedy for
every illegal imprisonment. But no imprisonment
is illegal where the process is a justification of
the officer; and process, whether by writ or warrant, is legal whenever it is not defective in the
frame of it, and has issued, in the ordinary course
of justice, from a court or magistrate having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, though there have
been error in the proceedings previous to the issuing of it.' Com. vs. Lecky, 1 Watts, 66."
In the committment of Demmick it should be noted
that when judgment was rendered execution was stayed
until January 4, 1943. On that day execution issued.
No hearing was necessary and no question of jurisdiction can be involved.
Counsel for plaintiffs herein cite and quote from
Atwood vs. Cox, 88 utah 437, 55 P. 2d 377 (1936) to
the effect that where the pleading shows on its face that
· the subject matter in regard to which jurisdiction is
attempted to be invoked is one over which the court has
no jurisdiction then the court has no jurisdiction to go
any further than to decide to refuse to take cognizance.
What is the subject matter of the.~hompson criminal
· prosecution? He was charged with robbery and being
an habitual criminal. That is of necessity the subject
matter.
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In the Atwood case jurisdiction is said to be:
'' * * * the power or capacity given by law to
a court, tribunal, board body or officer to entertain, hear and detennine certain controversies.''
The controYersy in the Thompson case was whether
Thon1pson was guilty of robbery and being an habitual
crin1inal. Certainly the District Court, a court of general jurisdiction had the power to determine this controversy. If that court did not have that power, then
under the Utah constitution and statutes no court had
that power.
The same is, of course, true 1n the case against
Demmick.
It should also be remembered that the Atwood case
concerned a writ of prohibition and the opinion indicates
that the courts have somewhat broadened the scope of
that writ because of a feeling that the remedy of appeal
,,-as ineffectual in some cases and the writ was issued
to prevent inferior courts from acting in a way that injury might be done and which could not be corrected.
This Court has held that prohibition will issue where
the complaint against a public officer to remove him
fr01n office does not state a course of action. This is
apparently accounted for on the theory that any order
made under such complaint would directly affect the
property right of such officer in his office and unless
the writ is~ue there is no other available or adequate
remedy to protect him.
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It would certainly be a sorry state of affairs if this
Court holds that the sufficiency of an information can
be tested by habeas corpus. A person held under an
information and awaiting trial could have the information tested in this Court and trial would not likely be
held until such matter was decided. At any time after
conviction proceedings of this kind could be maintained.
Criminal litigation would never be completed.
We submit that under the foregoing argument and
authorities the proceedings here instituted by Plaintiffs
can only require a determination of whether 103-1-18,
R.S.U. 1933 has been repealed.
POINT 2

SECTION 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 HAS NOT BEEN
HEPEALED BY I~IPLICATION OR OTHERWISE.
This point is in answer to point 2 of Plaintiff's brief.
That repeals by imp~ication are not favored needs
the citation of no authorities. It is only when necessity
requires such a holding that the courts hold there has
been a repeal by implication.
Section 103-1-18 was re. .enacted by the Legislature
in 1933, along with section 105-36-20. See State Tax
Commission vs. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55 P. 2d 171
(1936). Both sections must be given effect. There is no
inconsistency between them that requires disregard of
one of them. This Court has held that an indeterminate
sentence is a sentence for the maximum period provided
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by law for the particular offense involved. Mutart vs.

Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67 (1907); Lee Lim vs. Davis,
75 Utah 245, 284 P. 323, 76 L.R. 460 (1929); State vs.
Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P. 2d 584 (1937). If the maximum tern1 is for three years or n1ore, it is a term for not
less than three years. Haley vs. Hollowell 208 Iowa
1205, 227 N.vV. 165 (1929).
If we are to speculate on legislative intent it can
certainly be said that the legislature by the Indeterminate Sentence Law knew that it was providing that e.ach
sentence thereunder was for the maximum term and desired that th~ habitual criminal statute should apply
thereto because it did not mention that statute and did
not repeal it.
We submit that counsel for plaintiffs misconceive
the effect of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The
Board of Pardons was not giv~n by that act any power
which it did not already possess by virtue of the Constitution. The Board both before and after had the power to commute punishments (which includes the power
of parole, State ex rel. Bishop vs. State Board of Corrections, 16 Utah 478, 52 P. 1090 (1898)) grant pardons,
etc. Time served under a so-called ''judge-made'' sentence could be c~t down by the Board.
Counsel also states that "No sentence was definite
within the permissible minimum and maximum limits.''
This Court has held that indeterminate sentences are
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definite, they are for the maximum term. What the
Board of Pardons does or may do is not a part of the
sentence. It can not alter the fact that a person has been
sentenced and committed for the maximum period.
We submit that said section 103-1-18 has not been
repealed by implication or otherwise.
POINT 3

IN EACH CASE IT APPEARS FROl\1: THE INFORMATION THAT PLAINTIFFS HEREIN HAD
BEEN EACH TWICE SENTENCED AND COMMITTED TO PRISON FOR TERMS OF NOT LESS THAN
~rHREE YEARS PREVIOUS TO THE CRIMES
CHARGED THEREIN.
This point is in answer to point 1 in Plaintiffs'
Brief except we will not here consider the jurisdictional
question there mentioned. We believe that this has been
disposed of under Point 1 hereof.
In the Thompson case the previous sentences and
committments relied on were an Idaho sentence and committment for a term of not less than one or more than
fifteen years and a Utah sentence and committment for ·
a term of not less than five years to life.
In the Demmick case the previous sentences and
committments relied on were a Utah sentence and committment for a term not exceeding five years and a
California sentence and committment for a term of not
less or more than fifteen years. ·
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Under the cases heretofore cited these were all sentences and con1n1ittments for the maximum terms therein specified. In each instance the maximum was for not
less than three y,ears. See Point 1, Respondent's Brief
in State vs. \Valsh, Case No. 6643.
POINT 4

THE VERDICTS IN BOTH CASES HERE INVOLVED vVERE PROPER AND LEGAL.
This is in answer to Point 3 contained in Plaintiffs'
Brief.
These verdicts were in compliance with the charges
contained in the informations. By these verdicts the
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiffs
herein committed the crimes charged in the informations
and that each had been twice previously convicted, sentenced and committed as alleged in said informations.
These verdicts were necessary in order that the court
could impose the enhanced punishment provided for by
said section, 103-1-18. State vs. Findling, 123 Minn. 413,
144 N.W., 142, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 499 (1913).
POINT 5

UNDER SECTION 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 IT WAS
NOT N"ECESSARY THAT PLAINTIFFS HAD BEEN
CONVICTED OF THREE FELONIES BEFORE PROCEEDINGS COULD BE COl\IMENCED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WERE HABITUAL CRIM-

INALS.
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This is in answer to Point 4 of Plaintiffs' Brief, except the jurisdictional problem covered herein under
Point 1.
As we understand Plaintiffs' argument, it is their
contention that until after the conviction of Plaintiffs'
on the third felony no proceedings could be had under
said section 103-1-18. This is but a matter of procedure.
From all that appears here Plaintiffs' did not raise this
question in the trial of these cases. If this were an appeal
there is nothing in the record to show that this matter
could be raised. They may have consented to this procedure.
However, we submit that the proper procedure was
here followed and the Plaintiffs were properly informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them
and were tried by a jury on the issues raised by their
pleas. See Point 2, Respondent's Brief, State vs. Walsh,
Case No. 6643.
Section 103-1-18, R.S.U. 1933 provides:
''Whoever has been previously twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison, in this or any other state, or once in this and
once ·at least in any other state, for terms of not
less than three .years. each, shall, upon conviction
.. of' a 'felony- committed in this sta-te; other than
murder in Jhe first o:r second degree, be deemed
to be- an. habitual criminal, and shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for not less
than fifteen years; provided, that if the person
so convicted shall show to the satisfaction of the
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court before which such conviction is had that
he was released from imprisonn1ent upon either
of such sentences upon a pardon granted on the
ground that he was innocent, such conviction and
sentence shall not be considered as such under
this section.''
Counsel for Plaintiffs contend that the word "upon"
means after. If the Legislature 1neant after why did it
not us~ the word after~ Then, too, how long after.
Upon conviction here means at the time of conviction. At the time of conviction of the third felony he
shall be deemed to be an habitual criminal. At the time
of that conviction something must precede it in the way
of a determination that he had been twice previously
convicted before he can be deemed an habitual criminal.
How else that determination can be made in a court of
law other than upon pleading and proof we do not know.
Counsel does not enlighten us. If the statute indicates
any procedure it is the procedure here followed:
POINT 6-

THE COMMITTMENT _ OF_ DEMMIGK __WAS
-LEGAL.

This is an answer to Point 5 of Plaintiffs' Brief.
At the time Demmick was sentenced .on. November
-2_8, 1942, he was granted a stay of_.execution only _until
January 4, 194-3. No further stay was granted and com,mittment issued on that date.
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This case is entirely different from State vs. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 54 A.L.R. 1463. There
sentence was suspended during good behavior. There
was no fixed date to which it was suspended. It was an
indefinite suspension. The court held that in order to
revoke this suspension it was necessary that a pleading
be filed for such purpose, issues drawn and a hearing
held. In the case at bar there was nothing to revoke,
the stay granted expired and the committment issued.
CONCLUSION

This is not an appeal. Only jurisdictional problems
can be determined in habeas corpus.
We submit that section 103-1-18 has not been repealed and that that is the only problem here involved.
H·owever we believe that there is not even error in the
other matters raised by Plaintiffs and that the foregoing authorities and arguments confirm this statement.
Even though error was committed, Plaintiffs are
not entitled to an absolute discharge. They were still
convicted of the felonies of robbery, burglary and grand
larceny and should be sentenced therefor. Under Mutart vs. Pratt, supra, even though the sentences here are
erroneously set forth m tlie judgment, this Court can
'Consid~r ihem as the sentence provided. by law for the
feloni~s ot which they were properly convicted. In any
event "they should be remanded for proper sentence as
was done in Ex parte Folck, Folck vs. Watson, supra.
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We submit that the writ should be denied.
Hespectfully submitted,

GHOVEH A. GILES,
ZAR E. HAYES
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS.
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